We build a growth model with status preference to explore the e¤ects of patent protection on innovation and social welfare. The main results are as follows. There exists a non-monotonic relationship between patent protection and innovation, and the growth-rate-maximizing degree of patent protection decreases with the strength of status preference. Moreover, the e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare is ambiguous, depending on the strength of status preference. Finally, a cross-section regression based on a cross-country dataset is employed to investigate the empirical evidence of our theory. A signi…cantly non-monotonic relationship between patent protection and economic growth is found when the status preference is considered.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom argues that the patent system encourages innovation. This argument has been questioned by various empirical studies, such as Kortum and Lerner (1998) , Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) . They show that patent protection may retard innovation. Recently, Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007) report that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between patent protection and innovation. Thus, the important question of how patents will impact innovation and social welfare remains unsolved.
We develop a growth model with status preference, in which the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) between assets and consumption is decreasing in the amount of assets, to investigate the e¤ects of patent protection (patent breadth) on innovation and social welfare. On the one hand, as in the standard literature, patent protection promotes innovation by raising the value of innovation. On the other hand, patent protection reduces the MRS between assets and consumption, and thereby discouraging the accumulation of assets and innovation. 1 We de…ne this as the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. When the degree of patent protection is low (high), the MRS is small (large), and therefore the positive (negative) e¤ect of patent protection dominates. As a result, the relationship between patent protection and innovation is non-monotonic. Moreover, the degree of patent protection that maximizes growth rate decreases with the strength of status preference, since the stronger the status preference, the greater the substitution e¤ect. It is shown numerically that the e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare relies on status preference. Strengthening patent protection reduces social welfare when the strength of status preference is large (i.e., the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation is great), whereas there exists a non-monotonic relationship between patent protection and social welfare when the strength of status preference is weak.
Various macroeconomic papers have studied the link between patent protection 1 As in the standard endogenous growth models, the total assets are equal to the value of patents.
and innovation in the framework of endogenous growth theory. 2 Goh and Oliver (2011) and Chu and Pan (2012) , among others, can be used to explain the fact that stringent patent protection may sti ‡e innovation and economic growth. 3 Our paper provides a novel channel through the substitution e¤ect that gives rise to a non-monotonic e¤ect of patent protection on innovation and social welfare, complementary to the existing ones. This paper also relates to models with wealth preference (for example, Zou, 1994 Zou, , 1995 Zou, , 1998 Bakshi and Chen, 1996 ; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Futagami and Shibata, 1998; Smith, 1999 Smith, , 2001 Luo et al, 2009 ). 4 These models provide an interpretation for many economic phenomena such as savings, growth and assets pricing. To the best of our knowledge, however, the existing models with wealth preference do not address the issue of patent protection. Our paper contributes to this literature by exploring the impacts of patent protection on innovation and social welfare. This paper is also related to the cross-country studies of patent protection and growth. Park and Ginarte (1997) , Gould and Gruben (1996) , Varsakelis (2001) , Kanwar and Evenson (2003) , Schneider (2005) , Park (2005) , Falvey et al (2006) document that the relationship between patent protection and economic growth may be positive correlation or insigni…cant. Di¤erently, using the index of the spirit of capitalism developed by WVS (world value survey), we …rst empirically examine the e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth when the status preference is taken into account. The empirical results are in line with our theoretical predictions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and Section 3 characterizes equilibrium and analyzes the e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. A non-monotonic relationship between patent protection and innovation is generated due to the existence of the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Section 4 shows by simulation that the e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare varies, depending on the strength of status preference. Section 5 presents an econometric model to investigate the empirical evidence of the relationship between patent protection and economic growth, and Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 The Model
Preferences
In this model economy there exist L workers and each of them inelastically provides one unit of labor. Agent i maximizes discounted utility:
(1) where represents the inverse of the rate of intertemporal substitution, and represents time preference. c i (t) and a i (t) represents respectively consumption and assets of agent i, and a (t) represents the average level of wealth in the economy. Following Futagami and Shibata (1998) we assume that 1 (1 ) > 0 holds. The assumption that instantaneous utility depends on the status (the person's relative wealth position in the society) captures the idea of Hume, Marx, Veblen and others. 5 A similar utility function is employed by Bakshi and Chen (1996) . Moreover, alternative preferences that utility relies on the absolute level of wealth like Bakshi and Chen (1996) would not alter our qualitative result; see the Appendix C for details. 6 Hume (1978) states: "One of the most considerable of these passions is that of love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from a sympathy with the pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from love and esteem he acquires by them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second re ‡ection of that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others." We took this from Futagami and Shibata (1998).
The individual's budget constraint is standard:
where r (t) and w (t) denote the interest rate and the wage rate, respectively. A dot over a variable denotes time derivative. Here we normalize the price of consumption (the …nal good) to be unitary, and drop the time index as long as it does not cause confusion.
The maximization of (1) subject to (2) gives rise to the Euler equation on balanced growth path:
It is useful to note that
is the MRS between assets and consumption. Moreover, as in Futagami and Shibata (1998), = 0 measures the strength of status preference. Clearly when equates zero, (3) becomes the standard Euler equation.
In the meantime, the transversality condition of this dynamic optimization is given by:
where i (t) is the co-state variable of a i (t). Equation (4) implies g (1 ) > 0 in equilibrium. 7 The Euler equation
ai ai a a collapses to (3), since a i = a in symmetric equilibrium.
Production
The …nal good sector is perfectly competitive. In this sector …rms employ intermediate goods and labor to produce the …nal good using the following technology:
where N is the number of intermediate goods, k j is the quantity used of intermediate good i. The maximization of a …rm's pro…t yields the demand for intermediate goods:
where j is the price of intermediate good j.
To simplify, suppose patent length to be in…nite. 8 Suppose further that any …rm can produce one unit of intermediate goods by using one unit of the …nal good. Following Goh and Oliver (2002), we introduce patent breadth B 1 as the policy variable such that
That is, the wider the patent breadth, the greater the …rm's ability to raise the price. Combining (6) and (7), we obtain
where j is the pro…t of the …rm producing intermediate good j. 8 Finite patent length would not change main results, however; see the Appendix C. 9 Equation (6) suggests that the monopoly price is equal to 1 1 . It follows that B 2 (1; 1 1 ]. We restrict our attention to the case B < 
where Z is the resources devoted to innovation.
Patent Protection and Innovation
Denote the value of a new patent at time t as P (t). Then in equilibrium
Free entry into R&D business suggests that, in equilibrium
Combining (10) and (11), we derive
Di¤erentiating (12) with respect to the patent policy instruments, B, results in
Taking advantage of (13), we state the following lemma:
The interest rate rises with patent breadth. Moreover,
Stringent patent protection (broad patent breadth) raises the value of innovation, therefore driving up the interest rate (the return to assets).
It is useful to note that the equilibrium growth rate becomes r 1 (1 ) , if there is no status preference (e.g., = 0). In this case, Lemma 1 implies Lemma 2 Patent protection promotes innovation, if there is no status preference.
As Futagami and Shibata (1998), we only focus on symmetric equilibrium, in which c i = c and a i = a = a. Thus in equilibrium the resource constraint is
where
. In addition, the total assets owned by households equal the value of all patents. That is,
Note that in equilibrium = is a constant. Thus the MRS between assets and consumption is also a constant:
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to B, we reveal
It is followed by
Lemma 3
The MRS between assets and consumption decreases with the degree of patent protection, i.e.,
We refer to @( c=a) @B 0 as the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. In other words, patent protection lowers the growth rate through lowering the MRS between assets and consumption.
We are now ready to explore the relationship between patent protection and innovation. Clearly, the equilibrium growth rate is:
Equations (16) and (18) imply that
where @ ( c=a) =@g = < 0. Consequently, the e¤ect of patent breadth is straightforward due to Lemmas 1 and 3. The positive e¤ect of rising interest rate dominates when B ! 1, while the negative e¤ect of declining MRS is dominant when
Thus there is a non-monotonic relationship between patent breadth and innovation.
Proposition 1
The relationship between patent protection and innovation is nonmonotonic.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
A marginal change in patent breadth does not a¤ect the growth rate when B = 1=(1 ), because the monopoly price maximizes pro…ts. At the same time, large value of innovation lowers the growth rate owing to the substitution e¤ect. Therefore, …nite patent breadth results in the maximization of the growth rate.
Proposition 1 says that intermediate B maximizes the growth rate g. In this case, we examine how B changes when the strength of status preference changes.
Proposition 2
The growth-rate-maximizing degree of patent breadth decreases with the strength of status preference. That is,
Apparently, the larger the , the greater the marginal change in the MRS between assets and consumption. It means that bigger leads to higher substitution e¤ect. Therefore, the result in Proposition 2 is established.
In many developing countries, individuals strive for the accumulation of assets.
11
To some extent, Proposition 2 implies that patent protection in developing countries should be weaker than in developed countries. 12 
Social Welfare
In this section, we quantitatively analyze the e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare. Using (1) and (18), we …nd:
where S is social welfare, and
. As a result, we state Proof. See the Appendix A.
As usual, stringent patent protection decreases social welfare through monopoly pricing. It moreover lowers social welfare via sti ‡ing growth when B = 11 Zou (1994) discusses how the capitalist spirit contributes to development of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, China Hongkong and China Taiwang.
12 Deardo¤ (1992) and Grossman and Lai (2004) also stress that developing countries should implement weaker patent protection than developed countries.
The qualitative analysis is complicated, thus we use a quantitative method to explore the e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare for B 2 1; 1 1 . 13 To do this, we …rst calibrate the structural parameters to quantify the model. Following Chu (2009), we set the discount rate to 0.04, the rate of intertemporal substitution 1= to 0.42, the labor share to 0.7, the average annual TFP growth rate g to 1.33%, the real interest rate r to 0.084 and the markup is about 3%. Without loss of generality, we unitize total labor force, i.e., L = 1. Moreover, we assume N (0) to be 100 respectively for convenience. Using (12), we then pin down the innovation cost parameter to 0.061. The simulation result of relationship between patent protection and social welfare is reported in Figures 1-3 . 15 Thus we have 13 Simple algebra results in
Therefore,
, whereas
. In other words, reinforcing patent protection may or may not improve social welfare, even if patent protection is initially low.
14 There is no estimate on the value of . For simplicity, we only report the result when = 0:5. The results are robust to di¤erent , however. Furthermore, is determined once is given. 15 Obviously, B 2 (1; 10=3] if = 0:7. The result in Figures 1-3 is robust to the scale on the horizontal axis.
Claim 1 Strengthening patent protection lowers social welfare when the strength of status preference is large, whereas there exits a non-monotonic e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare when the strength of status preference is small.
When the strength of status preference is big (the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation is great), the positive e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare via stimulating growth tends to be weak. Thus social welfare may go down when patent protection becomes strong. In contrast, the positive e¤ect of patent protection is large when the strength of status preference is small (the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation is less). Consequently, the relationship between patent protection and social welfare is non-monotonic. Basu (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1997) document that the aggregate pro…t share is about 3%, while Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) reports that the markup is about 1.1 (i.e. a 10% markup) in the US. Thus B is between 1.03 and 1.1. By our simulation result, we conclude that a marginal increase in patent protection may raise or reduce social welfare even if the initial patent protection is low, depending on the strength of status preference. 
Empirical Evidence
In this section, based on the index of capitalism spirit developed by Dorius and Baker (2012), we empirically investigate how patent protection a¤ects economic growth when status preference is considered and how the growth-rate-maximizing degree of patent protection changes with status preference.
Data
For our main sample we use a panel dataset between 1980 and 2009. The database includes variables of economic growth, patent protection, the strength of status preference, and control variables. The data source of growth and control variables is Penn World Table 7 .1 (PWT) constructed by Heston et al (2012) , the data of human capital stock comes from Barro and Lee (forthcoming), the measure of patent protection is from Park (2008) and Ginarte and Park (1997) , and the measure of the strength of status preference comes from the World Values Survey (WVS) cumulative …le. 17 The growth data of a country is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita averaged between 1985 and 2009. For the measure of patent protection within a country, we use the index of intellectual property rights developed by Park (2008) and Ginarte and Park (1997) . The index covers …ve dimensions: 1) extent of coverage; 2) membership in international patent agreements; 3) provisions for loss of protection; 4) enforcement mechanisms; and 5) duration of protection. Each dimension is assigned a value between zero and one, and the overall index is the unweighted sum of these …ve values, with higher values re ‡ecting greater level of protection.
So far the available data for wealth preference are limited, and few literature provides proper measure. In this paper the measure of the strength of status preference is based on the WVS. The WVS is one of the richest and most cross-nationally diverse sources of information on people's attitudes, beliefs and values across a broad range of topics. This dataset covers a time-span of more than 30 years with 5 waves of survey. The …ve waves correspond to the years 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004 and 2005-2008 , respectively. The samples of each wave are randomly chosen so the panel is unbalanced, with some countries have …ve observations and some others only a single one. Thus we employ these data in a cross-section regression.
As a matter of fact, the measure of status preference in this paper is created from a subset of items in the WVS. In the survey respondents were asked to choose upto-…ve qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. 18 From where we stand, the choice of these qualities re ‡ects the basic character of a society's overall culture, which a¤ects the formation of individuals'preference. For our purposes we choose thrift saving money and things as a proxy for status preference. 19 The reason is that the preference of saving can change the absolute level of wealth as well as the relative position of wealth holding. Aggregated to the national level, we use the fraction of respondents who selected thrift saving money and things as important quality of each country in each wave as the measure of strength of status preference.
In the remainder of this paper, we refer to this measure as "status preference values" for the convenience of discussion. After collecting and merging individual and national-level data from various sources, a sample of 134 observations covering 61 countries and regions is constructed for status preference values. To begin with, basic descriptive statistics for this measure are reported in Table II . The mean value of overall sample is 34.98 and the standard deviation is 15.57. The number of observations per country is as follows: 21 countries have single observation; 22 countries have 2 observations; 8 countries have 3; and the numbers of countries with 4 and 5 observations are both 5. We simply note that countries in East Asia & Paci…c and South Asia tend to have higher overall status preference values, such as Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, note that the countries with multiple observations di¤er greatly in their standard deviations and the di¤erence between maximum and minimum. The largest standard deviation is 31.89 in Poland and the lowest standard deviation is 0.40 in Canada. And the di¤erences between maximum and minimum of these two countries are 56.81 and 0.57, respectively. Since the number of observations per country is so few that may not represent the overall level of status preference values per country, we attempt to do the regressions on subsamples with better data coverage in the sensitivity analysis, such as the sample of countries with more than 2 observations of status preference values.
honesty, feeling of responsibility, patience, imagination, tolerance and respect for other people, leadership, self-control, thrift saving money and things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, unsel…shness, obedience, and loyalty. 19 Similarly, Dorius and Baker (2012), choose hard work and thrift saving money and things as a proxy for capitalist value. 
Econometric Model
Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we follow and extend Gould and Gruben (1996) and Park and Ginarte (1997) to use the following equation for estimation:
where i = 1; 2; :::; N (number of countries). The dependent variable y i measures the annual economic growth rate of a country. The main independent variables p i and i are the measure of patent protection and status preference values, the larger the p i and i , the stronger the patent protection and status preference, respectively. Moreover, the vector x i captures other in ‡uence factors on innovation and growth, which act as control variables in our model (the intercept term is also included). We …rst control the e¤ects of GDP, investment, education and population growth as emphasized in the literature. Thus in the baseline model, the initial GDP per capita, gross investment ratio, initial human capital stock and population growth rate are included as control variables. Finally, the error term is denoted by i . As shown in the estimation equation, the interacted term that the square of patent protection multiplied by status preference value follows two results of our theory. First, according to Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, the negative e¤ect of patent protection on growth, which is called the substitution e¤ect, is derived from the interaction of patent protection and status preference, and dominates under strong patent protection. Second, the degree of patent protection that maximizes growth decreases with status preference value. Thus the square term of patent protection captures the negative e¤ect and non-monotonic relationship, while the multiplication of the square term and status preference characterize the second one. More specifically, 1 and 2 are expected to be negative and positive, and simple calculation reveals that the growth-maximizing degree of patent protection is 2 = (2 1 i ) > 0, which decreases with i .
In the cross-section model, the data are averaged over the year 1980-2009. We assume that the independent variables and control variables are independent of the error term, so we use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method for estimation.
Results
Tables III in the Appendix B.2 presents the baseline regression results, including three variations: (i) the benchmark regression without status preference, (ii) the benchmark regression with status preference as linear term, (iii) the baseline regression with interacted term. In the benchmark regressions, as shown in Columns (1) and (2), the linear term of patent protection exhibits positive e¤ect on growth, while the sqaure term display a negative one. This is within our expectation, but the coef…cients are all insigni…cant. Moreover, the e¤ects are still ambiguous even when the linear term of status preference is introduced, see Columns (3) and (4). In addition, the coe¢ cient of status preference value is positive but insigni…cant.
However, the result of baseline regression is desirable as the interacted term that the square of patent protection multiplied by status preference value is taken into consideration. The square term of patent protection interacted with status preference is signi…cantly negative at the signi…cance level of 10%, and the linear term of patent protection is also positively signi…cant at the level of 10%, which is consistent with our predictions. Furthermore, the estimated values indicate that the negative e¤ect of interacted term really dominates under stringent patent protection. In Column (5), the coe¢ cients of patent protection and interacted term are 0.0096 and -0.0043. If we set the value of status preference value to its mean, which is 34.98%, then the growth-maximizing degree of patent protection is about 3.19. Since the value of patent protection varies from 0 to 5, the negative e¤ect dominates when ipr 2 (3:19; 5) and the non-monotonic relationship is found in empirical evidence.
The regressions above are supported by the results of other control variables. In all of the …ve regressions, the coe¢ cients of four control variables and the intercept term are strongly signi…cant at the level of 5% or 1%, and their signs are in line with numerous growth literature (e.g., Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al, 1992; Ginarte and Park, 1997).
As a result, the main results present a signi…cantly empirical evidence that economic growth is non-monotonic in patent protection, and the degree of patent protection that maximizes growth rate is decreasing in status preference values. This provides a relatively robust estimation that supports our theoretical predictions.
Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the robustness of the baseline results above, a series of sensitivity tests are applied, by adding other variables commonly used in growth regressions and using subsamples of countries.
We …rst extend the baseline regression by adding more variables to control their e¤ect on growth, including openness, the in ‡ation rate, government consumption ratio. This group of regressions is divided into two steps. In the …rst step, the backward stepwise method is used in the regressions. The three control variables are …rstly all added and then the one with the least signi…cance is deleted backwardly. Secondly, another two regressions are obtained by adding only one control variable to the baseline regression each time. The results are reported in Table IV of Appendix B.2, which yields the main conclusions. For the variables of our interest, the coef…cient of patent protection varies slightly in value and is still signi…cantly positive at 10% in all of the …ve regressions. The coe¢ cients of interacted term and status preference become signi…cant at 5% level when their values remain. Additionally, the coe¢ cients of control variables in baseline model are still strongly signi…cant with similar values, and for the added three variables, only the coe¢ cient of openness term is positively signi…cant at 10%. Furthermore, the adjusted R 2 is larger in the backward stepwise regression than in the baseline regression. On the other hand, regressions on subsamples are also considered for sensitivity analysis. Several criteria are used for the choice of subsamples. Firstly, the overall culture and preference of a society may di¤er in di¤erent regions, thus three regressions are obtained by omitting the countries of one region each time. The three regions are Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Sahara. Moreover, since there is only single observation of status preference values in some countries, the sensitivity test is based on the countries with at least two observations of status preference values. Nevertheless, the model on the countries with at least three observations of status preference values is regressed as well. The results are presented in Table V of Appendix B.2. The coe¢ cient of interacted term is always negatively signi…cant at 5% level, while the term of patent protection and status preference become insigni…cant in Columns (1) and (4). However, these coe¢ cients are still signi…cant at 5% level in regression (3) and (5). Moreover, the signi…cance of several control variables is also weakened. Although the results of this group are not so desirable as those in the previous one, the estimations on subsamples still con…rm that the non-monotonic relationship between patent protection and economic growth is robust.
In conclusion, the sensitivity tests above provide hard evidence on the robustness of our baseline regression, which supports our theoretical results to a great extent.
Conclusion
An endogenous growth with status preference has been constructed to examine the impacts of patent protection on innovation and social welfare. As in standard literature, patent protection stimulates innovation by enlarging the value of innovation. In this model, the MRS between assets and consumption goes down when the amount of assets goes up. Great innovation value reduces individuals'incentive to accumulate assets (innovation) owing to low MRS between assets and consumption, and thus sti ‡ing innovation. This is called the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Strengthening patent protection promotes innovation, owing to a small substitution e¤ect, when initial patent protection is weak, whereas it hinders innovation, because of a large substitution e¤ect, when initial patent protection is stringent. In addition, it has been shown that the growth-rate-maximizing degree of patent protection decreases with the strength of status preference. The reason is that the larger the strength of status preference, the bigger the substitution e¤ect.
Furthermore, we have shown numerically that there exists a non-monotonic re-lationship between patent protection and social welfare when the strength of status preference is small, whereas reinforcing patent protection is harmful to social welfare when the strength of status preference is large. The intuition is that the strength of status preference determines the substitution e¤ect of patent protection on innovation, therefore determining the positive e¤ect of patent protection on social welfare through promoting innovation. We have …nally investigated the empirical evidence of our theoretical model. It has been shown that there exists a signi…cantly non-monotonic relationship between patent protection and economic growth when the status preference is considered. The negative e¤ect just comes from the interacted term, and the degree of patent protection that maximizes the growth rate also decreases with the strength of status preference in our econometric model. In the meantime, the empirical results are robust to a series of sensitivity checks as well.
It is complex to explore the e¤ects of patent length on innovation and social welfare. However, we expect that the qualitative results remain unchanged. This is left for future research. (12) and (18), we obtain
Di¤erentiating g with respect to B leads to .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Equation (20) reveals
Appendix B B.1 Description of the Dataset in Empirical Model
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 61 countries and regions. Variables used for estimation are listed below with their data sources. The names of countries and the classi…cation of the regions in the dataset are also listed. The variables of annual change rate (i.e., economic growth rate, population growth rate and in ‡ation rate) are calculated through logged di¤erence. In the cross-section regression, the data of annual variables are averaged between year 1980 and 2009. y: the averaged annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Source: Penn World 
B.2 Regression Results

Appendix C: Extensions of Theoretical Model
We extend our theoretical model with other alternative settings. We …rst use the utility function with absolute level of wealth to prove that our main results still hold.
We then compare the results in the case of in…nite length to those in the case of …nite length.
C.1 Absolute Wealth Preference
Suppose the utility function to be
where we assume 1 ( + ) (1 ) > 0. The maximization of (A8) subject to (2) results in the following Euler equation along the balanced growth path:
The transversality condition implies that g ( + ) (1 ) > 0. The Euler equation is exactly the same as (3) except for the parameter di¤erence in the denominator.
Moreover, the expression of social welfare here is
. This is also in the same form as (20) , if one ignores the constant term (1 ) and regard + as one constant. Since other things remain unchanged, it is obvious that our main results hold even if utility function depends upon absolute wealth.
C.2 Finite Patent Length
The patent system with …nite length adds the fact that some early created innovation will be expired. Denote the patent length as T . 
And the …rms'pro…t function is
In equilibrium the patent value is given by
Combining (A13) and the equilibrium condition P (t) = , we reveal
Using some algebra, the partial derivatives of r with respect to B is: . Moreover, simple calculation yields @r=@Bj B=1 = +1 and @r=@Bj B=1=(1 ) = 0.
On the other hand, the equilibrium resource constraint can be described as In the meantime, the total assets owned by households is
Thus, the ratio of consumption to assets is 
Di¤erentiating (A18) with respect to B, we …nd
As a consequence, we have 
Thus its partial derivative with respect to B is:
Since @ ( c=a) =@g < 0 due to (A23) Thus @B @ < 0. This is also the same as Proposition 2. Following the previous analysis, the welfare function in this case is
(
where = (1 )
1= B+ 1 1
(1 e gT )L g . Some calculus
gives rise to 
Taking advantage of (A14), (A18) and (A20), we get
when B = 1. Clearly d e =dg > 0, thus dS dB j B=1 > 0 is held when < e (e g) and dS dB j B=1 < 0 is satis…ed when > e (e g). These results are similar to those in the basic model.
